How to change power in an authoritarian state

An authoritarian system is extremely difficult to break, and it is extremely difficult to change the power within it. The problem is that mass demonstrations very often, by themselves, not only do not lead to a change in power, but often do not lead to any reforms at all. For example, in 2010s Russia, the demands of the popular masses for Putin’s resignation, the rotation of power, the release of political prisoners, and so on remained unanswered — the mass march against the “Dima Yakovlev Law” did not lead to the repeal of the law¹, and the protests on Bolotnaya Square and Sakharov Avenue put forward, among other things, demands for the release of political prisoners and the cancellation of election results² — they were also not met. This shows that a “velvet” revolution in Russia is impossible as of 2020. Is an armed uprising possible? The “Network” case (an organization recognized as terrorist and banned in the Russian Federation) showed that militant organizations will be crushed in their infancy (let us recall that there were only 11 people in the case³, most of whom confessed that they had to give testimony under torture⁴). Without such organizations, an armed uprising is also unlikely — there is no one to arm and nothing to arm them with. Furthermore, as we mentioned in the article on revolutionary conservationism, in practice, no one is organizing or intending to organize a revolution, which reduces the possibility of this option for changing power to zero.

Elections, as we have long realized, are controlled — by ensuring the turnout of public sector employees⁵, ballot stuffing⁶, falsifications during vote counting, mind manipulation before elections, and so on. That is, a victory through democratic means is extremely unlikely. Does it turn out that there is no choice left and authoritarian power is eternal?

What is non-monolithicity

We have long known that power in Russia is structured vertically. And at the top today, there is to a very high degree a monolith of “patriotic” views, a monolithic nomenklatura with common interests. They have disagreements regarding the evaluation of historical figures (removing/not removing Vladimir Lenin’s body from the Mausoleum, for example) and on other minor issues, but the vast majority of them, from the LDPR to the KPRF, are patriotic, traditional, they are all statists, they all dislike the “West”, they all love a “strong hand,” and they all share conservative values. Doctor of Political Science Grigory Golosov noted in 2014:

“Color revolutions” most often occur in countries that already function according to democratic rules, albeit with malfunctions. In authoritarian regimes, this is possible only in the final stages, when the split within the ruling class has gone very far and the electoral mechanism is not working. We only meet the second condition. It is difficult to name a country that is further from meeting the first. Maybe Brunei or Swaziland⁷.

It is this monolith that ensures control of power — elections, the army, the FSB, the propaganda machine, and other institutions. Therefore, the only method of struggle that is possible is similar to that which was used by dissidents in the USSR. This is the capture of the information field with one’s own alternative system of values. To create a coherent theory, a system of ideas that can solve the country’s problems (and at the same time fundamentally contradicts the prevailing one — in the current RF, this is conservative ideology), and to achieve its significant dissemination — means to gain supporters not only among the popular masses but also within the nomenklatura. That is, to create non-monolithicity and thereby create the possibility of a split in the elites. And when this happens, a part of the elites will either boycott the suppression of protest or even support the protest movement. Perhaps this will even be the majority of it — it depends on how good the alternative theory is.

Thus, mechanisms will be launched that once again allow influencing power through methods of protest, or even democratic voting. The conservative part of the nomenklatura will feel that the nomenklatura is not monolithic and that there is another, hostile part, and as a consequence, it will begin to fear harsh measures, in view of possible countermeasures (from imprisonment to military mutiny). In such conditions, if, say, a mass rally is dispersed, it will lead to conflicts within the nomenklatura, which will make the situation even more unstable, and the next rally may not only not be dispersed but even supported. Elections may not be falsified but counted in accordance with the laws. And so on.

Creating non-monolithicity

How to create non-monolithicity of the elites? The first step is, in fact, the development of a theory, the development of a system of ideas that will refute the system of ideas that dominates the nomenklatura. In many respects, the rise to power in the 1990s of liberal-conservatives in Russia was driven by the spread within the opposition of the system of views of representatives of the dissident movement like Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who wrote several shocking works for his time and was extremely active in political practice both in the USSR (among dissidents) and in emigration circles. For example, Radio Liberty believes that he is one of the few Russian writers whose works influenced the political life of Russia¹⁰; he is the author of “Letter to the Leaders of the Soviet Union”¹¹, which likely became one of the steps in creating non-monolithicity. As a result, today, Solzhenitsyn is highly valued by the current permanent President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin¹². Writer Vladimir Maksimov wrote about Solzhenitsyn:

His position at that time seemed to all of us absolutely correct and the only one possible. Any criticism directed at him, official or private, was perceived by us as a slap in the face or a stab in the back¹³.

What were the methods of the dissident movement in the USSR? It was not the preparation of armed struggle or mass processions (all of this was impossible). The main weapons of the dissidents were the creation of a geographically broad network of underground circles (including those with a human rights focus), the sending of letters, petitions, and appeals to official authorities, the publication and distribution of handwritten and typewritten publications (samizdat), the publication of works abroad without the permission of the Soviet authorities (tamizdat), the organization of public performances, the creation of funds for material assistance to political prisoners, the creation of the first programmatic documents (A.D. Sakharov’s work “Reflections on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom”, A.I. Solzhenitsyn’s “Nobel Lecture”), and the creation of media (“Chronicle of Current Events”)¹⁴.

All these methods of struggle are justified when facing an authoritarian state. As a result of them, the dissident system of views became dominant for a time after the collapse of the USSR in the post-Soviet space. Roy Medvedev wrote about the dissident movement that “without these people who preserved their progressive convictions, the new ideological turn of 1985–1990 would not have been possible”¹⁵. At the same time, the dissident movement actively collaborated with religious and national movements, and as a result, after the shocks of Perestroika, an explosion of religiosity and nationalism was observed in the post-Soviet space.

We also described how, after the Second World War and the penetration of Nazi ideas into the territory of the USSR, an antisemitic turn took place in the state’s policy. That is, a coherent theory that contradicts the prevailing system of views (even a flawed one, as we see in the example of Nazism) undoubtedly penetrates even into the nomenklatura and acquires convinced supporters there if it has widespread distribution. There are the examples of Rousseau and the French Revolution, and there are the examples of Marx and the Bolshevik coup. These theories forced even part of the elites to think hard, as shown by the examples of Philippe Égalité (Duke of Orléans, one of the leaders of the French Revolution¹⁶) or Savva Morozov (head of the Russian merchant class, who sponsored the Bolshevik party¹⁷).

Authoritarian governments have not yielded power until at least one of the influential groups within the regime realized that it was the only way to avoid major undesirable consequences: a significant loss of support in society, the use of violence against the civilian population, a split in the armed forces, serious economic damage, international ostracism, or threats to the country’s territorial integrity. A sense of humiliation in connection with military defeat, economic collapse, or failure in elections sometimes accelerated the regime’s departure. But these blows to the regime usually led to democratic transformations only when certain segments of the authoritarian government reconciled with or supported the opposition’s demands for the establishment of democracy¹⁸.

The extent to which a theory becomes widespread is also of great importance. We are unlikely to be wrong if we say that it is not the point of view that is correct that dominates, but the one that there is more of. Otherwise, how can one explain the prevalence of conspiracy theories, patriotic ideology, religion, and so on in modern Russia (a truly egregious example—the already mentioned spread of antisemitism in the USSR)? Only by the fact that the majority of people accept what they hear on faith (especially in Russia with its education system); the majority of people are not prepared to read a large amount of literature to figure out where the truth is and where the lie is. Therefore, it is enough for the state to release the necessary short talking points through its propaganda machine to create a lot of information and create a dominant point of view with the help of this mass. Of course, it is important for us that our system of views be correct (this is good from both a moral and a practical point of view — it is easier to spread), however, a correct system of views is not enough—it will only facilitate the task of spreading; what becomes vitally important for the result is its dissemination; it is important that there be a great deal of this system of views. The higher the level of dissemination of such a system of views, the higher the non-monolithicity, and the higher the chances for successful opposition actions.

It should be noted, however, that not every type of non-monolithicity is progressive. In an authoritarian state, the emergence of reactionary non-monolithicity is also possible, when one of the nomenklatura groups attempts to promote an even more reactionary policy than the one being pursued by the regime at that moment. Although it is necessary to oppose the aggressively reactionary part of the nomenklatura, one should not make this confrontation a higher priority than creating a constructive force.

What’s next?

In an authoritarian society, an official system of views dominates, but tipping points occur where society’s unrest spills out — mass protests, elections, and so on. And if we have a high degree of non-monolithicity, then the masses and part of the nomenklatura can be armed with a system of views that opposes the prevailing one, and in that case, upon the victory of the protest forces, this system of views will become dominant. What kind of system of views will this be? Firstly, it must dominate in the opposition. Secondly, it must have fundamental disagreements with the system of views prevailing in society as a whole (in this case, it will also be accepted by the part of the nomenklatura that becomes oppositionist).

Creating a system of views and organizing the work of spreading it competently lead us to winning ideological dominance in the opposition. After this, all that remains is to wait for tipping points and work on creating organizations. In such crises, the nomenklatura will intensely acquaint itself with the dominant theory of the “adversary”, and the broad masses will also acquaint themselves with this theory; however, they will acquaint themselves with it even outside of tipping points, only at a very slow pace. If this system of views convinces both a part of the nomenklatura and a part of the broad masses, this will create non-monolithicity. And when such non-monolithicity is created, one can expect anything — from the police refusing to disperse rallies to an ally of the protesters coming to power in the nomenklatura. It becomes possible to use an increasing number of methods of struggle — protests, voting, and so on. Non-monolithicity can lead to the point where organizing a demonstration in favor of passing a bill can indeed lead to its passage.

This is precisely how social democrats will achieve a change of power — in conditions of non-monolithicity, it will be possible either to win elections, or to achieve the passage of bills that will allow winning elections, or to produce a “velvet” revolution.

What to do

It turns out that the task of social democrats is to win ideological dominance within the opposition. This is not the most difficult task in an authoritarian state, as the opposition there is a fairly narrow space, and just a couple of dozen well-organized people might be enough to create a new force and then win ideological dominance. If these people are armed with a system of views that easily overturns other oppositional systems of views, this significantly simplifies the task, reducing it to purely mechanical activity of disseminating ideas. It follows that the first stage is the development of a coherent system of views that provides answers to questions about how to solve society’s problems, has a coherent program, forms brief talking points, and refutes the brief talking points of other movements.

The next stage is the creation of organizations. One person cannot effectively conduct political work — it includes many labor-intensive processes. Consequently, an organization is needed. If it is based exclusively on a voluntary basis, then, firstly, many of its members will not obey the general strategy because each person has their own views (which leads to endless splits). Secondly, due to the lack of materially reinforced obligations, as well as the fact that everyone has a job and a personal life, party work will not be performed in a sufficient volume. For example, the social democrat and participant of “City Projects” in Kazan, Garry Yantsen, derived two theses from his experience of activist work¹⁹:

1. Paid activity is more effective than volunteering;
2. Volunteering is better than inaction.

This thought is fairly generally accepted. A person who is one of the most well-known practitioners in the matter of changing power — Vladimir Lenin — also noted in his influential work “What Is to Be Done?” the importance of professional personnel, whose work requires financing:

The organization of revolutionaries must embrace first and foremost and mainly people whose profession consists of revolutionary activity…

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An agitator from among the workers who is at all talented and “promising” should not work in a factory for 11 hours. We must take care that he lives on the means of the party, that he is able to go underground in time, that he changes his place of activity, for otherwise he will not develop great experience, will not broaden his horizons, and will not be able to hold out for several years at least in the struggle against the gendarmes²⁰.

Therefore, the vector of the movement’s development depends on whether it manages to find financing. If it succeeds, the movement hires professional personnel and develops much faster. If it fails, the movement settles for volunteers and develops at a slow pace. Therefore, already at the initial stages of creating a movement, it is highly desirable to create a financial center, like the “Bolshevik Center” financial group in the RSDLP(b)²¹.

The next stage is the dissemination of materials. A person’s thinking is largely formed as follows: they consume content, compress it into a conclusion — a brief talking point — and based on the sum of all the brief talking points in their head, they structure their actions. Suppose that if a person has a set of brief talking points in their head like “social democrats have achieved nothing”, “social democrats came to power only thanks to the USSR”, “social democrats represent the interests of the bourgeoisie”, and other myths, they are unlikely to become a social democrat. But if these brief talking points are debunked and the refutations are brought to the masses, it is highly likely that people will become social democrats rather than communists or nationalists. Therefore, the dominant force becomes the one that has won the battle of brief talking points — has put forward the most of its own, refuted those of others, and been able to bring all this to the masses.

The first step of our scheme resolves the issue of putting forward our own brief talking points and refuting those of others. And the question of conveying information to the masses must be solved by an organization that will engage in the following methods of dissemination:

1. Creating one’s own media and materials;
2. Creating one’s own and friendly organizations, circles, trade unions, and so on;
3. Promoting media and materials;
4. Working with opinion leaders.

The concept of winning dominance within the opposition implies that every supporter of social democrats must show maximum activity, effectively becoming something like a so-called “evangelist”²² or a brand “advocate”²³. They must participate in the largest possible number of collectives — for example, parties and movements (or, for example, chats), and must be as active as possible in terms of broadcasting talking points (simply put, writing and speaking as much as possible). At the same time, they do not even necessarily have to promote the ideas of social democracy — the fact that they are a social democrat will be revealed in the course of communication, which will look much less intrusive. Given the existence of a strong system of views, people themselves will strive to familiarize themselves with it and, in the course of this familiarization, change their position.

Working with opinion leaders can significantly accelerate the process. If someone has direct access to the creators of popular channels or public pages, then, given the existence of a strong system of views, they can offer them a constructive plan of action and “handle objections”, which may win these opinion leaders over to the side of social democracy (perhaps not immediately). Sometimes it is enough just to ask them to evaluate one of the articles. This means a rapid and substantial expansion of reach, as well as the weakening of a competing movement. Therefore, it makes more sense to communicate, debate, and offer alternatives to opinion leaders than to other people.

Absolutely anyone, literally an ordinary supporter of social democracy, can make a huge contribution to the cause of changing power if they do any of the following:

1. Work on the development of the system of views (primarily writing articles);
2. Create media (from a Twitter account to a newspaper) and fill them with social-democratic content;
3. Leave links to these media on as many pages of the internet as possible;
4. Participate as actively as possible in any collectives, chats, and communicate as actively as possible with new people;
5. Participate in the creation of collectives and organizations (for example, trade unions — it could be said that every social democrat is obliged to join an independent trade union in their profession);
6. Persuade opinion leaders.

Since it is quite difficult to persuade people who already have an established circle of acquaintances with certain views (this may threaten them with a rupture with their environment, which is a difficult exit from their comfort zone), it is most important to exert influence on the youth. Communicating with young people and popularizing one’s views among them is one of the priority directions. In addition, we listed a complete list of possible methods of struggle against the authorities in a separate material — everyone should choose the ones most convenient for themselves and act.

In essence, we need 5 types of political activists. Each can choose a primary direction for themselves in order to improve it first and foremost:

1. Researchers — write serious articles, form the system of views;
2. Advocates — broadcast the system of views (in collectives, disputes on the internet, and so on);
3. Organizers — (create media and organizations);
4. Politicians — (participate in election campaigns and protests);
5. Financiers — (provide money).

The work of all these people is necessary, and for a new movement (and especially in conditions of an authoritarian system, when opposition politics is small in number), each new person provides a tangible growth if they are really engaged in one of the activities of the five types of activists. At a certain stage of the work on disseminating ideas, their ideological dominance arrives if a strong system of views is combined with strong work on its dissemination. As we have already said, given the existence of financing, the task is significantly simplified. When ideological dominance in the opposition is won, then at the moment of a tipping point, upon the creation of non-monolithicity, the system of views penetrates into the elites, and that is when a change of power through democratic methods becomes possible (the creation of parties, victory in elections, mass protests, and in extreme cases, a revolutionary path). It is precisely these processes that are the path of social democracy to victory.

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