“United Europe” vs. the USSR: how stalinists quote Goebbels

Among Stalinists, imperialists, and other “patriotic” movements, a popular point of view is that during the period of 1941–1945, the entire united capitalist Europe fought against the USSR, and the Red Army defeated it virtually single-handedly. This point of view is actively supported by the Russian nomenklatura as well, which long ago turned the victory over Nazism into a source of its own legitimacy. This viewpoint is encountered everywhere in Russia — for instance, the news agency Anna News writes that “the whole of Europe participated in the campaign against the USSR”¹. Another publication — Military Review — postulates: “practically the whole of Europe diligently contributed to strengthening Hitler’s army, rather than to its defeat”². Similar arguments regularly resound from federal channels³.

The thesis that no one helped the USSR in the struggle against Nazism we will additionally examine in a separate article. This article will be devoted to the “united fascist Europe that fought against the USSR” — let us see how well-founded this assertion is.

What is “Europe”?

To begin with, it is necessary to define the terms. What should be understood by Europe? It is a part of the world, the western part of the continent of Eurasia⁴. Obviously, the authors of the thesis under consideration understand Europe to mean all or almost all European countries west of the USSR. However, this is too serious a simplification: at the very least, Great Britain declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939, 22 months before the latter’s attack on the USSR⁵, and on June 22, 1941, it spoke out in support of the Soviet state despite all disagreements⁶ (in fact, the USSR fought Hitler for about 4 years, while Great Britain fought almost one and a half times longer — about 6 years). This is a vivid example of moving the goalposts — instead of “Axis countries” or the “Hitlerite bloc”, the nomenklatura’s propagandists use the term “Europe”, shifting responsibility onto modern developed European countries.

From 1939 to 1941, Europe for the most part was precisely fighting against Hitler. Poland, France, and Great Britain entered the war against him immediately. Later, as Hitler and Mussolini attacked these countries, the list of states opposing them came to include Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Iceland, Albania, Greece, and Yugoslavia. There is a video visualization of the changing map of military actions where this is clearly visible:

Now let us try to define what is included in the concept of the “Axis” countries. These are Germany (which at the time included Austria and certain territories of neighboring countries), Italy, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland (it is often singled out separately, but for simplicity we will consider it part of the Axis). These countries were relatively independent and could conduct autonomous policies. Also included in the Hitlerite bloc were Slovakia, Croatia, the Reichsprotectorate of Bohemia and Moravia (most of modern Czechia), the General Government of Warsaw (the southeastern part of modern Poland), and other puppet regimes in the territory of Denmark, Norway, France, Benelux, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Greece. However, these countries were occupied and pursued policies dictated from Berlin and Rome.

Now that we have defined the Axis countries, let us turn our attention to the neutral countries. In Europe as of 1941, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Turkey managed to maintain neutrality. These countries maintained trade with Germany, and their citizens could participate in the SS troops as volunteers. But we will analyze their contribution later. As a result of the war and Hitler’s aggressive actions, a significant portion of the countries of Europe found themselves under occupation.

Let us also examine the contribution of the listed countries to military operations against the USSR on the Eastern Front. This contribution could be purely military (participation in combat operations) as well as economic. First, let us examine military participation.

Military contribution of European countries to the war in the East

On June 22, 1941, the Wehrmacht invades Soviet territory. The German army, comprising 141 divisions, numbers about 2.5 million men. The maximum strength of the Wehrmacht in the East usually did not exceed 3.4 million men⁷. The Romanian army joined the German army. At its peak, its numbers reached 650,000 men⁸, which is quite a lot for 18-million-strong Romania. However, the advantages of the Romanian army ended with its numbers: it was poorly armed, poorly organized, and had an unqualified officer corps⁹.

A most crucial role was played by Finland, which entered the war 3 days later. The reasons for the Finns’ participation in the aggression of the Axis countries against the USSR are complex (and connected to the USSR’s attack on Finland before the war); we will touch upon them in another article. Finland’s entry into the war greatly changed the balance of power: it not only fielded 500,000 men in 1941 (a huge figure for a country with a population of just over 3 million¹⁰) and closed the ring of the Siege of Leningrad from the north, but also extended the frontline by more than a thousand kilometers in harsh climatic conditions. Finland’s participation also allowed the Germans to threaten Murmansk and, along with it, northern deliveries under Lend-Lease, which played an important role in the successes of the Red Army. Against this background, the 1.5 thousand Finnish SS volunteers seem hardly noticeable.

Hungary, for instance, stood out for its notable participation. Despite the fact that the Hungarian dictator Horthy did not seek to participate in the war¹¹, after the provocation with the bombing of the city of Kassa (Košice), Hungary declared war on the Soviet Union. Its army was not sent to the front immediately, as mobilization was delayed¹². The maximum strength of the Hungarian army on the Eastern Front did not exceed 200,000 men¹³.

Slovakia contributed quite seriously for a small country, sending 42,000 men to the Eastern Front while having a population of less than two and a half million¹⁴.

The remaining Axis countries provided support to the German army on the Eastern Front significantly below their real capabilities. Thus, the Italian Expeditionary Corps consisted of 3 army corps numbering 220,000 men¹⁵. Of the total size of the Italian army, this corps accounted for less than 10%¹⁶, while the main army guarded the home country against an Anglo-American invasion¹⁷. The remaining Axis countries effectively limited themselves merely to volunteer formations.

Now let us examine the participation of volunteers from the remaining countries and occupied territories. The most famous in Russia and the CIS is the Spanish “Blue Division” (note: in Spanish, it is blue), which at its peak numbered 18,000 men¹⁸. However, in October 1943, as part of maneuvering between the Axis and the Anti-Hitler Coalition, the Spanish dictator Franco recalled the “Blue Division”. At the same time, a number of military personnel decided to continue fighting, which led to the formation of the “Spanish Legion of Volunteers” or the “Blue Legion” numbering 2,000 men. This legion existed for less than six months; under pressure from the Allies, it was disbanded in April 1944.

In the territory of the occupied Netherlands, several units were formed with fewer than 7,000 men in each: a volunteer legion (3,000); 7,000 Dutchmen fought in the “Nederland” Brigade, and 2,000 in the “Landstorm Nederland” Brigade, which in 1945 became a “division” with a strength of 6,000¹⁹.

The situation with occupied Belgium is more complex. Three peoples inhabit its territory: Flemings, Walloons, and Germans. While the Germans and Flemings are Germanic peoples who were actively accepted into SS service, the Walloons are a Romance people, which prevented the SS leadership — blinkered by Nazi ideology — from using even a contingent loyal to them²⁰. However, as the situation changed, Walloon formations were also created. In total, assembled in Belgium were: the “Wallonie” Legion with a strength of 1,200 men; a 4,000-strong SS brigade of the same name; the “Flandern” Legion, and an SS brigade of the same name with a similar strength²¹.

The situation with Norway is interesting: the quisling government led by Vidkun Quisling attempted to conduct a mobilization of the local population, but it ended in failure. As a result, the assembled troops were several times smaller than the planned number, and 6,000 men of the regular army along with slightly more than a thousand volunteers were sent to the Eastern Front²².

Of the remaining occupied territories, only Croatia sent any significant contingent — 9,000 men²³ — while the other countries limited themselves to a symbolic presence of fewer than 500 men²⁴. Speaking of the remaining two neutral countries — Sweden and Switzerland — let us note that the two combined accounted for fewer than 2,000 men: 1,500 Swiss, and 200 Swedes and Estonians of Swedish origin²⁵. Such low numbers are linked to the policies of these countries, which actively tried not to lean toward either side as much as was possible in their situation.

Two countries remain that we have not touched upon: Bulgaria and France, both special in their own way. Bulgaria, despite joining the Axis, refused for domestic political reasons to fight the USSR and prohibited the formation of volunteer units from Bulgarians²⁶.

France, on the other hand, most often receives mockery and reproaches from Stalinists and various kinds of imperialists: “served the Germans”, “surrendered without fighting”, and so on. We are currently interested in the thesis that “more Frenchmen fought for the Germans than against them”. Let us count: six and a half thousand French volunteers in the Wehrmacht; the 7,000-strong “Legion of French Volunteers Against Bolshevism”; the SS Brigade “France” with a strength of one thousand men; and the SS Division “Charlemagne” with a strength of fewer than seven and a half thousand men²⁷. At the same time, 55,000 volunteers fought for Free France, among whom were not only Frenchmen, but also residents of the vast French colonial empire²⁸ (if we speak of those mobilized, the figure increases to 1.4 million men). The choice of the French is more than obvious.

However, there is another spicy moment in the history with France: the fact is that the Reich annexed the territory of Alsace-Lorraine and drafted 130,000 men from it; a third of them deserted, and many willingly surrendered into captivity²⁹. A similar fate befell the residents of Luxembourg, in whose territory the Germans also introduced conscription in 1943. Interestingly, out of 11,000 drafted, a third of Luxembourgers followed the example of their Alsatian brothers in misfortune and deserted³⁰.

Thus, the total number of non-German formations, excluding formations of Soviet citizens, in the Axis forces on the Eastern Front did not exceed 40% of the size of the German army. Often, these formations were significantly inferior to the German ones in equipment as well as in training quality.

How the economy of “United Europe” did not work

At this point, our opponent might claim: “Fine, let us assume that Europeans generally did not want to fight for Hitler, but they worked for the German economy, meaning that economically the USSR was fighting all of Europe”. Let us look at the contribution of the economies of the Axis countries and the territories they occupied to the war.

The main problem with this thesis lies in a fundamental misunderstanding of how the economy works as a whole and of what the European economy represented in the middle of the 20th century. An economy cannot exist without international trade; complete self-sufficiency under those conditions was practically impossible. At that time, the main import items for Western European countries were food and oil. In conditions of food shortages, worker labor productivity drops sharply, while the absence of oil means, first and foremost, a lack of fuel, and a shortage of fuel hinders the efficient operation of enterprises, including agricultural ones.

Now that we have highlighted this feature, let us look at the economy of “Europe conquered by Hitler”. From September 1939, the Axis countries and all territories occupied by them were subjected to a British blockade, which made foreign trade difficult and, over time, stopped it completely. This led to a shortage of fuel, rubber³¹, and food. Germany, facing the blockade in 1939, lost 80% of its imports, and raw material consumption was at a level of one-third of the 1932 figures (which belonged to an already crisis-ridden period)³².

It would seem that in 1940, when Germany achieved victory in the West, this should have solved the problem at least partially. In reality, the problem worsened: while Germany prepared for war and blockade by striving for autarky, the captured European countries did not, and to preserve their economies, Germany had to somehow compensate for lost imports. Thus, for example, France consumed no less than 5.4 million tons of fuel per year, most of which came from imports, while Germany at its peak received only 8 million tons of fuel per year. As a result, the French economy was put on a starving fuel ration, receiving only 8% of its pre-war consumption, which, together with the plundering and seizure of industrial equipment and enterprises, led to economic collapse³³. A similar fate awaited all occupied territories.

As a result of the German occupation, the economy of Western European countries suffered severe damage: during the entire period of occupation, not a single country experienced economic growth, and the most developed ones suffered a major decline. At the same time, daily calorie intake fluctuated between 1300–1600 against a norm of 2400 for an adult male, which very seriously affected labor productivity³⁴. This can be seen in military deliveries from occupied territories to the Reich: by the end of 1941, France and the Netherlands had delivered 78 aircraft to the Reich, and throughout the entire war — about three and a half thousand, which was a quarterly output for the German aviation industry³⁵.

Nevertheless, a number of countries could be useful to Germany even in such a dire situation. Thus, approximately 40% of consumption was covered by ore purchased in Sweden, or 1.5 million tons of fuel that the Reich imported from Romania³⁶. However, in this case, we are talking about trade — albeit not always equal and fair — and not about economic subjugation, as Stalinists try to portray to us.

Thus, the thesis “the socialist economy of the USSR against the united capitalist economy of fascist Europe” is nothing more than a manipulation and a propaganda construct lacking factual confirmation.

Other arguments

Now let us examine a few more arguments that decisively debunk the thesis about “the whole of Europe”. The first argument is the resistance movements in European countries. One can debate the role and contribution of the partisan movement to the success of the Anti-Hitler Coalition, but the high number of its participants is beyond dispute: we have already mentioned that 55,000 volunteers fought for Free France. The Polish resistance was active as well, and active partisan warfare was waged in Yugoslavia, Greece, and Northern Italy.

Our second argument flows from the first: the active participation of volunteers from occupied countries on the side of the USSR. Widely known are the French Normandy-Niemen squadron or Hero of the Soviet Union, the Spaniard Rubén Ruíz Ibárruri. The Polish Armia Ludowa also fought on the side of the Red Army. An important role was played by King Michael I of Romania, who overturned the military dictatorship of General Ion Antonescu and joined the USSR in the struggle against Germany. A similar role was played by the Bulgarian Fatherland Front. Furthermore, volunteers of various European nationalities — Romanians, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Yugoslavs, and so on — fought in the Red Army. Can one speak of a “fascist Europe” if millions of Europeans, voluntarily risking their lives, fought against Hitler?

The final and strongest argument: during the first two years of the war — from 1939 to 1941 — it was precisely the whole of Europe that was fighting against Hitler, during which time Germany committed aggression against 12 European states. In this period, the USSR not only did not fight the Reich, but even helped it bypass the British blockade through raw material deliveries, as well as purchasing raw materials from third countries and transporting them to the Reich (we provided figures here), though the failures of Soviet foreign policy deserve a separate article.

Many Stalinists will say: “Europe simply gave up; the war was a formality”, but despite their mythology, European countries as a whole offered fierce resistance, and the myth of “Europe surrendering to Hitler’s mercy” deserves a separate article of its own; here we will speak briefly. Thus, the campaign in Yugoslavia and Greece postponed the attack on the USSR by several months, as a result of which the German offensive on Moscow began not at the end of summer, but in the autumn — in mud and cold. Did this affect the success of the Red Army?

Another example is the campaign of May–summer 1940. In a single day, May 10, the Luftwaffe lost 347 aircraft, and in three weeks of fighting — a third, that is, 1,000 aircraft, which equaled everything the Germans produced in May³⁷.

Paradoxically, the main idol of the Stalinists did not share their views — in July 1940, in a conversation with British Ambassador Stafford Cripps, Stalin said: “I am not so naive as to believe individual verbal statements by individual leaders regarding their unwillingness to dominate Europe and the whole world <…> I know that they lack the power for world domination <…> In order to have domination in Europe, one must have domination on the seas, and Germany does not have such domination”³⁸.

We will also write a separate article about how the Allies helped the USSR in the war. It will also say a lot about how the thesis “all of Europe fought against the USSR” fails to correspond to reality.

Conclusion

Although “patriots” claim that all of Europe attacked the USSR, we have the following facts:

1. Prior to this, a significant part of Europe fought against Hitler’s Germany and fell under its occupation, while Great Britain fought against it for the entire war;
2. There were several neutral states that did not take either side;
3. Occupied states resisted occupation, and in economic terms, there was little use derived from them.

Thus, the thesis of a “united fascist Europe attacking the USSR” is nothing more than a myth of Nazi propaganda (as is known, Joseph Goebbels is one of the authors of the expression “crusade against Bolshevism”) and later Soviet propaganda, which modern Russian propaganda and many communists have eagerly picked up. The use of such clichés says a lot about the speaker’s views, integrity, awareness, and respectable status. Furthermore, the dissemination of such propaganda clichés minimizes the role of our allies in World War II, and in the event of military trouble in the future, it will make future potential allies think twice about whether they should help Russia if its citizens will not only fail to appreciate this help, but even accuse them of aiding war criminals. Thus, the “patriots” spreading the myth of a “united Europe” are in reality not patriots, but traitors to the country who put Russia’s security at risk.

1. Anatoly Matviychuk. The whole of Europe fought against the USSR // ANNA News – frontline news agency (anna-news.info). July 15, 2020, 13:10. [Online resource]. URL: https://anna-news.info/protiv-sssr-voevala-vsya-evropa/ (Accessed: 11.07.2021).
2. Anna Polyakova. The whole of Europe fought against the USSR // Military Review (topwar.ru). May 9, 2013. [Online resource]. URL: https://topwar.ru/27724-protiv-sssr-voevala-vsya-evropa.html (Accessed: 11.07.2021).
3. The whole of Europe fought against the USSR // YouTube (www.youtube.com). May 29, 2017. [Online resource]. URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nhuct4tW2v4 (Accessed: 11.07.2021).
4. E.P. Romanova, A.M. Nikishin and others. Europe // Great Russian Encyclopedia. Volume 9. Moscow, 2007, pp. 535-554. [Online resource]. URL: https://bigenc.ru/geography/text/v/1974265 (Accessed: 11.07.2021).
5. Neville Chamberlain’s declaration of war // The Guardian (www.theguardian.com). September 6, 2009, 12:05. [Online resource]. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/06/second-world-war-declaration-chamberlain (Accessed: 11.07.2021).
6. Alliance with Russia // International Churchill Society (winstonchurchill.org). [Online resource]. URL: https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1941-1945-war-leader/the-fourth-climacteric/ (Accessed: 11.07.2021).
7. F. Halder. The Halder Diaries: The Private War Journals of General Franz Halder. – M.: Voenizdat, 1968-1971
8. David Glantz, Jonathan House. When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. – 463 p. – Moscow: AST: Astrel, 2007. – pp. 301-303
9. F. Halder. The Halder Diaries: The Private War Journals of General Franz Halder. – M.: Voenizdat, 1968-1971
10. David Glantz, Jonathan House. When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. – 463 p. – Moscow: AST: Astrel, 2007. – pp. 301-303
11. F. Halder. The Halder Diaries: The Private War Journals of General Franz Halder. – M.: Voenizdat, 1968-1971
12. Ibid.
13. M. Zefirov. Aces of World War II. Allies of the Luftwaffe: Hungary. Romania. Bulgaria. Croatia. Slovakia. Spain. – M.: AST Publishing House, 2002. – p. 73
14. S.I. Drobiazko, O.V. Romanko, K.K. Semyonov. Foreign Formations of the Third Reich. — M.: AST; Astrel, 2011. — p. 343
15. G. Messe. The War on the Russian Front: The Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia. – M., 2009. – p. 33
16. P. Jowett. The Italian Army 1940–45 (1): Europe 1940–43. – M., 2002. – p. 4
17. E.G. Safronov. Italian Troops on the Soviet-German Front. 1941-1943. – p. 94
18. S.I. Drobiazko, O.V. Romanko, K.K. Semyonov. Foreign Formations of the Third Reich. — M.: AST; Astrel, 2011 – p. 112
19. Ibid., pp. 156-158.
20. Ibid., p. 25.
21. Ibid., pp. 212-227.
22. Ibid., p. 225.
23. Ibid., p. 264.
24. Ibid., p. 210.
25. Ibid., pp. 242-244.
26. Crampton, Richard J. (2014). “Bulgaria”. In Dear, I. C. B.; Foot, M. R. D. (eds.). The Oxford Companion to World War II (online) (1 ed.). Oxford University Press.
27. Ibid., p. 134.
28. François Broche, Georges Caïtucoli et Jean-François Muracciole, La France au combat, p. 149
29. Mikhail Lapikov. Reich or freedom: what did France choose? Warhead (warhead.su). February 21, 2020, 10:15. [Online resource]. URL: https://warhead.su/2020/02/21/reyh-ili-svoboda-chto-vybrala-frantsiya (Accessed: 11.07.2021).
30. S.I. Drobiazko, O.V. Romanko, K.K. Semyonov. Foreign Formations of the Third Reich. — M.: AST; Astrel, 2011 – p. 239
31. F. Halder. The Halder Diaries: The Private War Journals of General Franz Halder. – M.: Voenizdat, 1968-1971
32. Adam Tooze. The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy – p. 438
33. Ibid., pp. 499, 523.
34. Ibid., pp. 532-539.
35. Ibid., p. 522.
36. Ibid., p. 523.
37. Ibid., p. 486.
38. J.V. Stalin. “Reception of the British Ambassador S. Cripps, July 1, 1940” // J.V. Stalin, Works. Vol. 18 (Tver, 2006), pp. 191-193. See also: S. Pons, Stalin and the Inevitable War, 1936–1941 (London, 2002), p. 202–203.