Creating a broad coalition

We have already noted in a separate article that a developed parliamentary democracy cannot take shape in the country without a broad opposition coalition. But how can it be created? Today’s Russia is very far from creating a broad coalition, and this path will have to be traversed almost from scratch. At the moment, few people have even an approximate idea of how this coalition will look and work. In this article, we will attempt to formulate its fundamental principles.

Who will join the broad coalition?

In the article on the broad coalition, we noted that coalitions with authoritarian movements usually end in collapse or submission to the authoritarians. Also, because of authoritarians, some democratic forces are unwilling to join the coalition, as happened, for example, with the Opposition Coordination Council (OCC), when the Yabloko party refused to join it (“we have a party decision from our congress that we cannot be part of any structures or engage in any joint projects with left-wing radicals and nationalists”¹). One of the most famous dissidents of the USSR era, Vladimir Bukovsky, noted that “the CC chose the path of broad representation of different political currents, and this will lead to even greater disagreements”². He was right: for instance, radical nationalist Nikolai Bondarik, who was a member of the CC, attempted to block its activities³ and actively criticized its participants (up to using jokes with a Nazi flavor), as a result of which the question of the need for his expulsion arose before the CC⁴, and Bondarik himself began to seek the expulsion of other CC members⁵. And for the sake of such people, “Yabloko” was lost.

Therefore, it is obvious that a broad coalition should not be formed from just any organizations, and not on the principle of “gathering everyone who is against the government” (or against anything else), but on the principle of uniting around a positive demand and common moral principles. Today, such a demand is the requirement for parliamentary democracy, and the principles are human rights.

Organizations that share the demand for parliamentary democracy and desire political pluralism should join the broad coalition. Organizations that seek to dominate the country’s political field cannot join here — only those organizations that recognize the need for strong democratic counterbalances to themselves and for real political competition. Organizations that share the demand for parliamentary democracy can “coexist” with other parties both in a broad coalition and in parliament. Another condition is that an organization must respect human rights and condemn their violation. That is, an organization that justifies, for example, the crimes of Joseph Stalin, or radical nationalists, cannot join the broad coalition.

Organizations that incite strife and withdraw from the coalition will thereby show that they are incapable of building democracy and do not know how to seek compromises or find a consensus. The same can be said of organizations that do not want to unite in such a coalition — how do they intend to build democracy in the country if they do not want to establish cooperation with other democratic organizations and take their opinion into account? It is logical to expect that even after coming to power, they will not want to share it with anyone.

In today’s Russia, the potential participants in a broad coalition include:

• The “Yabloko” party;
• The “Urban Projects” Foundation;
• The Anti-Corruption Foundation;
• The “Social Democrats of Russia” party;
• LevSD;
• The “Vesna” movement;
• The Rose Movement;
• The “Memorial” Human Rights Center;
• RSD (in the latest version of its program, the movement recognized the need for parliamentary democracy: “Russia of the near future should become a federal parliamentary republic with elements of direct democracy”⁷);
• Union of Democratic Socialists;
• Media project “OVD-Info”;
• PARNAS;
• “Solidarnost” UDM;
• Moscow Helsinki Group;
• Sakharov Center;
• Museum of the History of the GULAG;
• Independent trade unions (“Teacher”, “Courier”, “Solidarity”, “Action”, KTR, OPR, and so on).

Also, in the event of acknowledging the need for parliamentary democracy and clearly stating this in their documents, other organizations may be included. It is also possible to include large democratic-leaning media outlets in the coalition, such as MBK or Meduza (provided they are willing to participate in the country’s political life).

For the sake of example, we will call such an organization the “Democratic Alliance”. It can be noted immediately that a truly working broad coalition must be formed only as a result of the union of several organizations, and not created by one organization (as, for example, the libertarians attempted to do with “Civil Society”⁸). The fact is that if a coalition is created by one organization, then the entry of new organizations into it will essentially be viewed as coming under the control of the creator organization, which, as the creator, will play a dominant role (while others will have the status of secondary organizations). Furthermore, new organizations will be included in a coalition whose structure and principles of action were created by one organization without considering the opinions of others. Therefore, no one will unite around such artificial structures — a broad coalition will be formed only as a result of union and dialogue between several already existing and equal participants, each of whom will be a creator of the coalition.

Why it is needed

A broad coalition has advantages that are obvious to its participants. First, it is a kind of “non-aggression” pact — coalition members must refrain from criticizing each other’s organizations until the coalition achieves total victory. This will help minimize situations where opposition members criticize each other instead of the government.

Second, it facilitates coordination. For instance, this includes conducting joint actions under the leadership of a general democratic organizing committee, organized on the principle of a parliament. Actions by individual organizations are usually small, whereas actions by a broad coalition can gather many more people. Also, the Democratic Alliance’s organizing committee is capable of coordinating the organizations’ media regarding issues that need to be covered by everyone (for example, cases requiring the widest possible publicity). Creating general city chats is also possible, which would be useful in the provinces, where opposition groups are quite small and scattered.

Third, it provides general instructions: what to do during a search, upon detention, and so on. Today, individual organizations have these instructions, but a broad coalition would have a higher audience reach, as well as more feedback on them.

Fourth, it enables mutual assistance. Primarily, this includes reposts, linking to each other, and so on. Simply being on the list of links to Democratic Alliance participants on the coalition’s website or in chats is an additional opportunity to learn about an organization. This also includes exchanging experience, expanding personal contacts, learning how to engage in dialogue, and broadening one’s own knowledge through interacting with people holding different points of view.

Fifth, it provides additional advertising. It will be easier for people to understand that the leftists in the Democratic Alliance do not advocate for the return of the USSR, the nationalists do not advocate for fascism, and the liberals do not advocate for anarcho-capitalism. Distancing oneself from marginals and utopians of all stripes is an important step on the path to democracy.

How it will be organized

As a result of forming the Democratic Alliance after the completion of relevant negotiations, a coalition organizing committee will be created. The powers of the organizing committee:

• Managing common media and chats (appointing/removing responsible persons and issuing instructions to them);
• Organizing joint actions;
• Drafting and editing the Charter of the Democratic Alliance;
• Drafting and editing the program of the Democratic Alliance;
• Admitting new organizations to the coalition;
• Drafting recommendations for participating organizations;
• Appointing/removing the coalition’s treasurer and determining the procedure for collecting contributions;
• Appointing/removing those responsible for holding organizing committee meetings;
• Drafting appeals to the government;
• Negotiations with the government.

The organizing committee’s recommendations are not mandatory for participating organizations to follow, however, their systematic non-fulfillment is grounds for considering the expulsion of an organization from the Democratic Alliance. We should already be thinking about the powers, charter, and program of a broad coalition so as not to end up in a future comic situation similar to the one Boris Nemtsov commented on at the second meeting of the Opposition CC. He noted there that the CC had been elected, but its powers had still not been defined.

Due to the lack of clearly defined powers, most candidates for the council did not give much thought to what they would actually do in the CC¹⁰, and some, such as Ekaterina Aitova, resigned due to a “busy schedule” and lack of time to participate¹¹.

The coalition must have common media — a website and accounts on social networks. Responsible executors are appointed by the organizing committee. The organizing committee also creates an organizing committee chat and Democratic Alliance city chats in every city, appoints those responsible for moderating them, and has the right to replace these individuals at any moment.

The question of how to form the organizing committee remains open. How should it be formed? How many people should be in it? In our view, it should be formed via elections. Only members of Democratic Alliance participating organizations with at least 5 months of tenure should have the right to participate in the elections (which will help reduce the probability of a “zerg rush” by various dubious forces, as was the case with Sergei Mavrodi’s supporters who attempted to seize the CC¹²).

As for the coalition program, it should include those requirements that are common to all potential participating organizations. That is, in essence, the program will be limited to establishing a parliamentary democracy with a description of a model acceptable to all coalition participants, and a description of the process of a peaceful transfer of power. Potentially, the program could also include requirements for a treaty on the voluntary lustration of the nomenklatura, as well as ensuring the independence of the judicial system; however, there may be serious disagreements on these issues, so it is unlikely they will be adopted specifically as the coalition’s program.

Summary

A broad coalition is not only necessary for creating a parliamentary democracy with a high level of pluralism, but it will also be useful for establishing cooperation between the country’s democratic forces. It is capable of uniting them for the sake of victory over utopian populists and spoilers within the opposition, without dissipating the strength of democratic organizations in a struggle against each other, which primarily helps the authorities.

However, its creation requires several strong democratic organizations. Without a left wing — that is, social democrats and democratic socialists — this coalition is unlikely to have support among the broad masses. Therefore, the fact that there is no mass social democratic movement or party in Russia today complicates the possibility of creating such a coalition. It is also necessary to draft the Democratic Alliance Charter and begin negotiations between potential participants; the regulations for organizing committee meetings must be drawn up in advance.

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